

SUHARTO SETS UP HORROR

PRISON IN DILI: DAILY BEATINGS FOR PRISONERS

OVER 1,000 East Timorese political prisoners are being held in horrific conditions in the former SANG TAI HOO cement warehouse, which has been transformed into a prison by the Suharto occupying forces in Dili.

The Sang Tai Hoo warehouse, situated near the Dili abattoirs, is the scene of the most brutal tortures and daily beatings.

Prisoners are not subject to any court hearing, but are thrown in prison on the arbitrary decision of the Indonesian military.

Former Fretilin guerrillas, including even those who were fooled into surrendering by Indonesian promises of amnesty, are subject to beatings every day. All prisoners are starved and live in deplorably unhygienic and over-crowded conditions.

East Timorese are thrown into prison on any excuse: one man was put in prison because a relative

in Australia wrote a letter which showed, in Indonesian eyes, too much curiosity about the situation in East Timor. Another, a former rich (and reactionary) plantation owner, was severely beaten and thrown into prison when he asked for a share of the coffee from his plantation, which is seized by Indonesian officers.

Others are thrown in prison for even the mildest protest against the brutality and barbarity with which Indonesian troops treat the Timorese civilians.

EAST TIMOR NEWS calls on all supporters of the East Timorese people, on governments and organisations supporting human rights to strongly protest to the Indonesian Government against the inhuman conditions in the Sang Tai Hoo prison, and for the immediate release of all political prisoners in East Timor.



SUHARTO'S NAVY

THE Suharto regime is going on a huge spending binge to build up its navy in the next few years.

In an article in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (April 6), David Jenkins outlines the major purchases of the Jakarta regime:

** Four 250-ton fast patrol boats from SOUTH KOREA, armed with surface-to-surface missiles and a top speed of 40 knots, they can even sink a large, well-armed warship. Cost: \$53 million on "exceptionally good terms";

** Two new West German submarines, of very modern design, with "the engines British, the electronics Dutch, the guns Swedish, the missiles French and the communications system West German," with "financial guarantees" from the Bonn Government. The subs will be used in the "Sunda and Lombok Straits and other strategic Indonesian waterways." Cost:

** Three new corvettes being built in HOLLAND "without doubt... the most advanced in this part of the world". One will be fitted with a platform for a BO-105 helicopter. Total purchase price of US\$ 105-120 million, plus high training and support program costs. They will patrol the waters of Maluku and Irian Jaya

** Six lightweight 16-metre patrol boats provided by Australia last

year, and two 146-ton "Attack" class patrol boats provided by Australia in 1973-4. Eight Nomad N-24 turbo-prop short take-off and landing aircraft provided by Australia also serve for long-distance patrolling. A further four will be supplied this June.

Only financial troubles from the recent one-third devaluation of the rupiah has hindered even greater purchases, according to Jenkins.

Although Jenkins does not say so, much of this naval expansion is for tightening the blockade around East Timor, and to strengthen patrolling around Irian Jaya.


Suharto's efforts to rebuild his navy date from the period when East Timor became a question -- 1974. Previous to that, the navy was maintained in a deliberately backward situation in relation to the army, as it was suspected of "Sukarnist" tendencies.

The construction of a new navy became an urgent issue when the blockade of East Timor began in earnest after December 1975.

Protests against supply of an Suharto with these sophisticated ships has already begun in Europe and must be developed even more strongly.

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THE LIFE OF NICOLAU LOBATO

The following article is based on one published in "Ost-Timor Aktuell" published in German from Seltersweg 73, D-6300, Giessen, West Germany. Some additions have been made. Translation by East Timor News Agency.

ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic Association) on May 20, 1974. The 20th. May was the founding day of the ASDT-Fretilin, and has since been celebrated as the Day of Revolution in East Timor.

FRETILIN FORMED . SEPT. 1974

September 12, 1974: ASDT is transformed into FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor). ASDT found, after several months of legal activity that the next step of the East Timor Revolution required the gaining of independence and the establishment of a new society. On the organisational level, a broad front was necessary, which could unite the whole population to fight for this task. For this purpose FRETILIN was formed. Comrade Nicolau Lobato became Vice-President of Fretilin, which after only a few months had signed up around 200,000 members. Comrade Nicolau Lobato was one of the few who even then recognised that an important new phase of the revolution of the Maubere people had begun. In order to be totally involved in the organisation of the masses, he gave up his job and went to Bazartete where he organised the first co-operative. He saw the importance of patiently convincing the peasants of the needs for the type of co-operative Fretilin was advocating, as the Portuguese had earlier mobilised peasants into co-operatives which were quickly seen as a means of further colonial exploitation by the peasants.

In a short period, he organised 15,000 people in the Bazartete area into co-operatives. Rice was grown, animal husbandry increased and new agricultural lands developed, in an exemplary co-operative movement which then began to extend throughout the whole country. Comrade Nicolau Lobato recognised that time was very short for Fretilin and the Maubere people, and studied a great deal during his stay in the rural

STUDENT DAYS... 1946..1967

Nicolau dos reis Lobato was born in Soibada on May 24, 1946. After primary school, he entered the seminary in Soibada to train as a priest. This was the only means at that time to study in East Timor beyond the primary school level. He emerged as a spokesman for the seminarians and as a result he got into trouble with the priests and was forced to leave the seminary early. Shortly afterwards, he was prevented from continuing his studies in a foreign country, for political reasons, even though he passed his entrance examination at the Dili Lyceum with excellence. From 1967 to 1970, he was conscripted into the Portuguese army in East Timor. While in the army he wrote several newspaper articles about education and culture in East Timor. He also studied history, particularly that of the anti-colonial resistance struggle of his people.

UNDERGROUND GROUP FORMED ... 1970

Foundation of a discussion group on colonialism. After leaving the army, comrade Nicolau Lobato earned his living as a public servant in the colonial administration. Under the difficult conditions of fascism, he tried to get literature from Lisbon, through students there who were his friends, in order to provide material for a secret discussion group meeting in Dili, to discuss colonialism and to seek a way forward to independence.

After the fall of fascism in Portugal, he led the founding of the

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NEW STAGE IN EAST TIMOR LIBERATION WAR AN ETNA BACKGROUNDER

IT is now four months since the betrayal and surrender of Alarico Fernandes to the Indonesians, and over three months since the death of comrade President Nicolau Lobato.

The recent months have undoubtedly been the most difficult and, at the same time, the most crucial that the East Timorese Revolution has passed through since the full-scale invasion in December 1975.

These difficulties have also, of course, been repeated for Timorese living outside their country, and for the supporters of the East Timorese Revolution around the world.

For those living outside the country, the loss of the radio contact has been important, as now direct contact with the Fretilin forces inside the country has also been lost.

To attempt to find out what is happening inside East Timor, we and other supporters must rely on letters smuggled out of Dili and from reports from recent refugees. All these sources are of a nature which need thorough checking, cross reference and a good deal of scepticism applied to them, whether they be "good" or "bad" reports.

It is very easy to get an ultra-optimistic or ultra-pessimistic view from taking these reports at face value.

Similar reports have been available in the past, and when checked against Radio Maubere reports, sometimes gave valuable insights, but were as often wildly inaccurate, being based on rumours.

In attempting, in the past few months, to present a picture of what is happening in East Timor, and particularly in the military field, we have used reports from Dili and from refugees. We have however attempted to get at least two independent reports of the same thing, before making a firm statement.

With these reservations, then, we will attempt some analysis of the present situation in East Timor.

The betrayal of Alarico Fernandes and the murder of comrade President Nicolau Lobato in December 1978, were both sources of great encouragement and satisfaction to the Indonesian Generals.

INDONESIAN HOPES DASHED

They confidently predicted that victory was finally in their grasp and that Fretilin would be finished within months, if not weeks. This is confirmed by a first-hand report of a conversation with a top Indonesian air force officer in Dili.

However, although the blow of the death of comrade Lobato was a great one, Fretilin forces in their big majority, refused to surrender. Some have surrendered, but this has been a trickle, in terms of the actual guerrilla fighters. Most of those who have surrendered have been civilians, mostly from the educated elite, who fled Dili on the fullscale invasion, as well as the old, the very young and the sick.

The vast majority of Falintil and the Maubere people refused to surrender, and carry on the heritage of Nicolau Lobato.

Militarily, the Indonesians followed up the murder of comrade President Lobato, with a major offensive in the Alas area, in the



Centre-South Sector. Conflicting reports have come from Dili concerning the outcome of these battles. However, reports confirm that the fighting was particularly intense, and that the Indonesians suffered heavy casualties. However, it appears that some villages were captured and destroyed, while helicopters brought troops into mountain top positions, with heavy artillery to shell the surrounding area.

In the Centre-North Sector, it is clear that Fretilin forces continue to operate there, and that small guerrilla groups of four or five men are launching night attacks even in the centre of Dili.

Some reports claim that Fernandes is accompanying Indonesian troops on operations in the Centre North Sector and that Fernandes is based in Aileu. Despite the bad food situation in the Centre-North Sector, Falintil forces are still fighting strongly, although in smaller groups than previously, when they were operating in company strength.

In the eastern part of the country, in the South Border and North Border Sectors, Fretilin forces, according to some reports, have been on a limited offensive since January. One, unconfirmed, report claims that Fretilin forces had recaptured the village of HATOLIA, in a very mountainous area south of the coffee-growing centre of Emera and Fatobesse. Moreover, reliable reports confirm continuing strong resistance in the south border sector, right up to the villages of Fatumean and Fatululic, only a few kms. from the Indonesian border. Similarly, strong resistance continues around the main town, Suai, as well as in the Zumalai area, on the south-east coast.

In the centre-east sector, unconfirmed reports claim that the Indonesian forces have finally captured the village of Quelicai, after many unsuccessful attempts in

the past three years. Fierce resistance continues there, and in the Baguia area to the west. Fierce fighting was also taking place in the Uatolari-Uatocarrabou area, on the south-west coast late last year, but no further reports have come through.

In the eastern point sector, around Lospalos, reports confirm that, at least until two months ago, the situation was still calm, with no major Indonesian offensive in progress.

In relation to the food situation, reports confirm that it is disastrous for the vast majority of Timorese living in Dili, and even worse in the concentration camps (last numbering a total of 14) scattered in the villages occupied by the Indonesians.

In Fretilin-controlled areas, the situation is very bad in the Centre-North Sector, and is also worsening in the Centre-South Sector. The border areas and the eastern half of the country are in a much better situation, in the liberated areas. No one is starving in these areas.

These facts have a political explanation: the enemy offensives began in September 1977 in the border areas and in June 1978 in the centre-north sector. Yet the food situation in the former is much better in the latter, where Fernandes was the leading force in Fretilin until his betrayal.

From this sketchy outline, based on limited information, it is clear that resistance continues and there is no indication of a "collapse" of resistance and morale as so strongly hoped for by the enemies of the East Timorese people.

However, there are signs, although not definitive, that the armed struggle is also entering a new phase.

Until mid-1978 at least, Falintil was organised into regular companies and many military operations took place at company strength. That is, one or a few hundred troops would take place in major actions, having the security and strength to do so.

From reports available, it now seems that Fretilin forces are operating with smaller units, and, in the Centre-North Sector particularly with groups of 4 or 5 guerrillas in operations.

Guerrilla war never proceeded in a straight line, with ever-increasing organisation and strength until final victory. Rather, as they involve primarily a political struggle, and face superior forces militarily, and in East Timor face physical isolation, it would be indeed remarkable if the struggle continued in a straight upwards line, without ebbs and flows.

POLITICAL DECISION

It is to be expected, then, that the ability or desirability to organise into company-strength groups may be lost or disregarded at certain periods. However, a decision to fight in smaller groups may also correspond to a new situation in the political field: a desire to really organise the armed forces and people for a protracted war. With such a perspective, it may be necessary to preserve armed strength, and therefore, in given situations, to not contest as strongly as before the enemy when it enters into areas previously fully under Fretilin control.

It must be clearly understood that at least until the end of 1977 and probably until 1978, Fretilin forces controlled the vast majority of the population and territory. It was not propaganda to make claims of controlling 90% of the population and 80% of the land. This was the reality, and is now confirmed by many other sources.

This had been the situation since the beginning of the invasion in December 1975. That is a remarkable tribute to the East Timorese people, Fretilin and Falintil. Indeed, throughout the first two years of the invasion, Suharto's troops had great difficulty in holding even strongly garrisoned towns in the interior and on many occasions were forced to withdraw, or were simply over-run.

SUCCESS & PROBLEMS

By mid-1976, Fretilin forces had to a large degree stabilised the situation. Indonesian forces were restricted largely to raids, which were immediately met when they crossed Fretilin front lines. Major offensives were defeated, and if the Indonesians in a major push took a new village, they were generally forced out relatively soon after.

Fretilin strategy at least until the end of 1977 consisted of seeking to maintain the whole population in the liberated areas, and preventing the Indonesians from capturing them. This policy was successful. Yet it also posed major problems.

First, the very success of the strategy meant that political clarification was slower in arriving than it may have been otherwise.

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We have covered some of these points in previous articles : the belief that the war could be won quickly and that outside help would come to help that. This was the line of Xavier do Amaral and Alarico Fernandes. When all was going well, and the vast majority of the population could be organised and cared for in the liberated areas, this line co-existed, although in great tension, with the revolutionary line of a protracted, people's war based on self-reliance.

When it did not appear that a quick end to the war was in sight, then this line became openly capitulationist and counter-revolutionary.

This also had its implications in the military field and in the organisation of the Falintil.

It is now clear that some sections of the former non-commissioned officers of the colonial army, who became in many cases commanders of Falintil, never accepted the concept of a protracted people's war, and instead based their organisation and military concepts on a perspective of a relatively short struggle and of outside help. When this became clearly unattainable, then these commanders also took a capitulationist line.

CAPITULATIONIST POLICY

These two lines, at first hidden and then openly capitulationist, also had their effect within the population. In those areas, particularly in the centre-north and to a lesser extent, the centre-south sectors, where these capitulationist lines were strong, then inevitably the population was also affected. Confusion arose also from the false confidence and illusions built from the perspective of a quick victory.

In such areas, the organisation of the army and of the administration and economy left much to be desired in terms of a real, deep-rooted mobilisation of the masses. Such mobilisation cannot be made by populist speeches, but by the serious grassroots organisation of the masses, instilling in them not a false hope of some outside saviour, but of their own strength and self-reliance.

In the concept of the conservative line, any substantial setback would of course put an end to the illusion of a quick victory. It would also have a demoralising effect on those who while verbally supporting the revolutionary line,

did not understand the real meaning of such a line.

To maintain virtually the whole population in the liberated areas, to try to maintain front lines behind which they lived in relative stability and security, was in the longer term a very difficult and even dangerous endeavour.

On the other hand, to allow the civilian population to fall in the hands of the invaders was to give them up to a slave existence, which the people themselves would also resist.

However, in one sense, it passed the initiative into the hands of the invaders. Virtually the whole country became a free-fire zone; the enemy had the initiative in choosing where it would concentrate its forces and try to inflict maximum damage. It freed them from worries of maintaining any attempt to feed and win the population to their side.

When American advisers came to East Timor to aid the Suharto troops at the end of 1977, they were able to exploit these advantages. This was particularly so in the Centre-North and to some extent, in the Centre-South Sectors, where the conservative line was strong. By concentrating forces and attempting to disrupt food production and destabilise the liberated areas, they began to wear down the control that Fretilin had maintained over two years.

This was accompanied by a deliberate attempt to, first of all, woo the educated elite from the mountains with promises of an amnesty and fair treatment, and secondly, by a major attempt to kill or capture the main leaders of Fretilin.

The betrayal of Xavier do Amaral and Fernandes helped in all these tactics, and particularly in the efforts to kill the revolutionary leaders.

TRADITIONAL GUERRILLA

On all available evidence, it appears that Suharto's forces, after three and a half years of brutal aggression, have in some areas, finally penetrated the liberated areas, breaking up and destabilising these liberated zones. Some of the educated elite previously in these liberated areas, have surrendered, while there has been a trickle of Falintil guerrillas going to Dili. Others, including Maubere, have been captured. As a result, the war is entering a more traditional phase. Fretilin forces are operating in smaller groups, often with great efficiency, against more spread out Indonesian forces, who the more villages captured, the more they must

garrison if they want to prevent Fretilin reoccupying them. This places them in many more vulnerable positions and makes it more difficult for them to defend them. It can be said that the initiative is now returning much more to Fretilin.

Put in another way : because of the setback, which essentially have political roots, the Fretilin forces are put in less a defensive position, trying to protect virtually the whole population and 80% of the territory, and are able to go on limited small-scale offensives, with small guerrilla groups, against isolated enemy targets, now spread more thinly throughout the countryside. Certainly, the Indonesians are present in much wider areas, and control more of the population. Nevertheless, the majority are still in the liberated areas. But even if the Suharto forces finally control the majority of the population, this will face Fretilin with the task of building contacts within the controlled population, on a traditional guerrilla pattern.

OFFENSIVE POSITION

It may seem illogical to say that because the Indonesians control more population and territory than previously, Fretilin is now in a more offensive position than when they did not. Yet that is the situation, and means that far from victory being around the corner for the invaders, they will face a new type of guerrilla war in which it is even more difficult to destroy Fretilin forces.

Thus, the basis exists for Fretilin to reconstruct their army on a new basis, both politically and militarily. If this is done successfully, then the Suharto forces face a long war, with steadily rising casualties, possibly not at the same rate as before, but with no end in sight. The new offensive capacity of Fretilin, no matter how limited, give the possibility of finally exhausting the enemy.

Within this perspective, it is incorrect to see the situation in terms of territory or population controlled. Certainly, the fact that Fretilin held the vast majority of the country and population for so long is a tribute to their strength and the heroism of the Maubere people. But to see the loss of important areas such as the Centre-North in terms of the previous control exercised, or, even, in the future,

of even larger areas to Indonesian control, as a sign that East Timor cannot win victory, is totally incorrect.

Guerrilla wars cannot be measured in terms of territory lost or won; of population controlled or not. People's wars are measured in the long term perspective, in terms of a continuing war, of insecurity and instability in the areas controlled by the enemy, by the casualties suffered by the enemy over a long period, by the effects on enemy morale and so on.

It is our belief that in the present situation in East Timor, the long-term offensive initiative is in the hands of Fretilin. It is even conceivable to say that the war in East Timor is now actually moving for the first time into a strictly guerrilla war, where there are no "front lines". Even to speak of "front lines" is to imply a more positional war, even if this had no clearly defined structure.

The basic thesis put forward in this article is advanced for discussion, more than a hard-and-fast conclusion.

However, one fact is clear : it is necessary to deeply analyse the nature of the liberation war that has taken place in East Timor, and the present situation, in an attempt to clearly understand the concrete perspectives for the future.

DEMORALISATION & ILLUSIONS

If, however, the thesis advanced in this article is even more-or-less correct, then the perspective for the solidarity movement and more generally the work in the outside world must be looked at again. Above all, it is clearly unproductive to either look at the perspective for victory in terms of the past, which have been generally adopted : that is, to see the hope for victory in terms of territory or population under Fretilin control.

This has always been a wrong measuring rod, and now, if applied, can lead only to either demoralisation (because territory and population have been lost), or to illusions that the situation remains as before.

More than ever before, the real meaning of a protracted people's war needs to be thoroughly understood.

LIFE OF NICOLAU LOBATO

areas, to gain an understanding of the requirements of armed guerrilla struggle, based on his knowledge of the masses. He visited countless tunnels and caves which had been used in previous wars, for example against the Japanese. He even founded several arms caches. During this time, comrade Nicolau Lobato was often found sitting up late at night familiarising himself with revolutionary literature which to a large extent only became available to him after the fall of fascism in Portugal.

VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE ...MARCH 1975

Comrade Nicolau Lobato visits Mozambique. On the question of foreign policy, there were two lines within Fretilin. Some hoped that through friendly relations with Australia and Asian countries, these countries would at least take a neutral stance in relation to East Timorese independence. Comrade Nicolau Lobato, who understood the

international connections with liberation movements in other countries, sought to establish fraternal links with all such movements and States. He thus established the first contact with Frelimo and in Mozambique was warmly welcomed by comrade Samora Machel. In contrast to this warm welcome from comrade Samora Machel, was his visit to Portugal, where he was to lead negotiations with the Portuguese Government. He was, however, only received by lower public servants. Comrade Lobato went back to Mozambique a few months later to take part, at Frelimo's invitation, in Mozambique's independence celebrations.

UDT PUTSCH ...AUG. 1975

The unsuccessful putsch by the reactionary UDT. On August 10, 1975 the Fretilin Central Committee became aware of the putschist plans of the UDT, a party of Spinola supporters. The Fretilin leadership withdrew from Dili to Aileu, approximately 40 kms south of the capital. Nevertheless,

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the UDT managed to capture some Fretilin comrades in Dili and some were killed. When the Portuguese colonial authorities took no action against the UDT coup attempt, the Fretilin Central Committee called for armed resistance. Under the leadership of comrade Lobato, the reactionaries were disarmed in Aileu. The Timorese soldiers of the colonial army followed the call of the Fretilin Central Committee and joined forces with Fretilin throughout the entire country. After about four weeks of fighting Fretilin controlled the whole country. Domingos Lobato, the younger brother of Nicolau, was murdered by the UDT.

Comrade Nicolau Lobato clearly realised that the Suharto regime would now intensify its invasion plans. Thus the construction of FALINTIL (the national liberation armed forces), the armed wing of Fretilin, and the organisation of people's militias took on prime importance. Comrade Nicolau Lobato played a leading role in this task. On October 15 1975, the Indonesian border invasion began. The militia and Falintil proved itself by bringing the invasion to

a standstill 8 kms. from the border. A unit of women combattants took a significant role in this. The goal of the invaders to take Dili by a land invasion was shattered.

INDEPENDENCE NOV. 1975

Nicolau Lobato becomes Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Since the defeat of the UDT putsch, Fretilin had been in *de facto* control of all of East Timor. Yet the Portuguese were still unwilling to begin the decolonisation process together with Fretilin. Therefore, facing also the increased Indonesian aggression with the marine attack and capture of Atabae, Fretilin declared independence and founded the Democratic Republic of East Timor on November 28, 1975. Fourteen States soon extended diplomatic recognition to the DRET. One week later, on

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THE LIFE OF NICOLAU LOBATO FROM PAGE 3

December 7, 1975, Indonesian forces attacked Dili from air and sea. A bloodbath began against the civilian population of Dili, in which the wife of comrade Nicolau Lobato was a victim. His young son was captured by the invaders. Despite their technical and military superiority and their barbarous brutality, the Suharto troops were only able to occupy some towns, where they were surrounded by Fretilin forces. In the war that followed, Suharto troops massacred over 100,000 East Timorese civilians, while tens of thousands of Suharto troops lost their lives.

At the important meeting of the Supreme Council of Struggle and Fretilin Political Committee meeting in Soibada in May 1976, comrade Nicolau Lobato was among those leading comrades, including comrades Mau-Lear and Sa'he, who debated and fought the capitulationist line of the then President Xavier do Amaral and his supporters. Comrade Nicolau Lobato, firmly

representing the revolutionary line, that only the protracted people's war based on relying on their own strength, could lead to final victory.

On September 14, 1977, after a long struggle against the capitulationist line of Xavier do Amaral, and after his plans for a coup and joint actions with the Indonesian invaders were discovered, comrade Nicolau Lobato made an important speech over Radio Maubere, denouncing the betrayal of Xavier do Amaral and announcing his arrest. This speech is an important document of the East Timorese Revolution, clearly revealing the two lines within Fretilin, and the will for final victory represented by comrade Nicolau Lobato.

PRESIDENT LOBATO

...OCT. 1977

Comrade Nicolau Lobato is elected President of Fretilin and of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

On November 28, 1977, Radio Maubere announces that the Fretilin Central Committee has elected Nicolau Lobato President of Fretilin and the DRET and Antonio Duarte Carvarino (Mau-Lear) Vice President of Fretilin and Prime Minister of the DRET. This represented a major victory for the revolutionary line of Fretilin.

On May 20, 1978, comrade Nicolau Lobato gave his last major speech over Radio Maubere, in which he rejected any compromise on the question of total independence and the legitimate rights of the Maubere people, and called for the total and immediate withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, as a prerequisite for any negotiations. Comrade Lobato referred to the Indonesian campaigns of encirclement and annihilation in the border areas which had begun in September 1977, and which were sinking into defeat.

The former Minister for Information and National Security, Alarico Fernandes, had since the defeat of the Xavier group, been actively preparing a coup under the code-name of "Operation Skylight". This was discovered by comrade Nicolau Lobato and other revolutionaries in the Fretilin Central Committee and in September 1978, Fernandes with a small group of supporters in the Centre-North Sector, entered into revolt against the Central Committee.

Fernandes named comrade Nicolau Lobato as the main enemy of his counter-revolutionary coup, and listed him and a dozen other revolutionaries including comrades Mau-Lear and Sa'he on his assassination list.

When Fernandes failed to win support for his Operation Skylight inside and outside the country, he surrendered to Suharto's forces

on December 3, 1978, after being under heavy military attack by Falintil forces.

HEROIC DEATH

...DEC. 1978

President Nicolau Lobato fell in combat against the invading forces. The internal knowledge provided to the invaders by Fernandes, and the treason of his agents still active in the Centre-North Sector and the bordering areas of the Centre-South Sector, enabled the Suharto troops (at least 2,500 of them) to lay an ambush for comrade Nicolau Lobato in the Maubesse area, on the border of the Centre North Sector.

The Indonesian soldiers failed in their efforts to capture comrade Nicolau Lobato alive, because he refused to surrender even when surrounded, and fought to the end. Severely wounded, he fought until he collapsed through loss of blood and died shortly after.

The death of comrade President Nicolau Lobato and the betrayal of Xavier do Amaral and Alarico Fernandes inflicted severe losses on the Maubere people. But the work of the Fretilin Central Committee under the revolutionary leadership of comrade President Nicolau Lobato, and his political education work among the cadres and masses, and as well his heroic example remain an excellent basis for overcoming the setbacks suffered from time to time, to advance on the road to final victory. Fretilin leaders such as comrades Mau-Lear, Sa'he, Hamis Basserwan, Helio Pina, Carlos Cesar and others will carry on the revolutionary line of their leader and comrade-in-arms Nicolau Lobato. The Maubere people will always respect his heroic example and fight to final victory.

Independence or death! Victory is certain and only a matter of time! The struggle continues!

Suharto sets up Dili prison

Suharto has set up a huge prison in Dili, the capital of East Timor, in the former cement warehouse owned by the Chinese trader Sang Tai Hoo.

Dili reports say that between 1,000 and 1,500 prisoners are held in the new prison, which is near the abattoirs. Former guerrillas, including some who surrendered, are daily beaten and tortured by Indonesian guards.

People are held there on the mildest suspicion and without trial. One Dili resident was sent to the prison after receiving a letter from a relative in Australia asking about the food situation in the capital.

Prisoners are poorly fed and live in terrible conditions in the crowded former warehouse.

The Campaign for Independent East Timor calls for worldwide protests against the horrific

conditions in the new Dili prison. It has asked Amnesty International and other human rights organisations to protest to the Suharto government and visit the prison.

Other reports indicate that small groups of Fretilin guerrillas continue to stage attacks in and around Dili. Residents do not leave their homes after 7pm for fear of Fretilin attacks.

According to unconfirmed reports reaching Lisbon, Fretilin forces recaptured the town of Hatolia in the west,

Canberra Times 10/4/79

TRIBUNE 10/4/79

Three freed from jail

JAKARTA, Monday (AAP-AP). — The release was announced today of Mr Sutomo, Professor Ismail Suny and Mr Mahbub Djunaidi, three outspoken critics of the Government, two years after they were imprisoned without trial.

Mr Sutomo, better known as Bung Tomo for his role in leading Indonesians in the struggle against the Dutch during the revolution, was arrested for his harsh criticism of the Government.

Professor Ismail Suny, a lecturer at the University of Indonesia and rector of a private university, was arrested on charges of anti-Government activities.

close to the coffee-growing area of Ermera and Fatobesse.

Other reports confirm that Fretilin Vice-President Mau Lear is alive and leading the fight in the mountains against the invaders, despite Indonesian claims that they killed him early in February.

Reports from Dili and other sources indicate that Fretilin forces continue to strongly resist the invaders although betrayed by Alarico Fernandes and President Nicolau Lobato's death were serious setbacks.

Fernandes' betrayal followed the deepening of the revolution in the liberated areas which still continues and guarantees continuing resistance.

AUSTRALIAN 7-8/4/79

From GADIS RASID in JAKARTA

SEVERAL "silent" court cases involving students are taking place in Indonesia.

In Jakarta, Medan Surabaya, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Malang and Palembang cases are going on which the Indonesian press is forbidden to report.

They concern students who last year — pending the session of the Indonesian Congress — organised demonstrations and actions against the re-election of President Suharto.

These actions were forcefully put down, universities were closed and student leaders arrested.

Aside from these students, the Indonesian Government also arrested a well-known Indonesian writer and poet, Rendra, several university lecturers and a freelance columnist.

The arrests took place not only in Jakarta but in other university towns and can be considered, therefore, as a nationwide movement against General Suharto.

When the Congress session was over and President Suharto re-elected most of the demonstrators were released. But even then the students insisted on a court trial, defying the Government's policy of arresting people without cause and freeing them when convenient.

It was perhaps the purpose of the students to turn these trials into other minor demonstrations, but the Government forestalled this by banning coverage of the trials.

After many hassles and several postponements the trials began at the end of February.

In contrast to previous court cases relating to student activities — those in 1974 when students agitated against the Government during the visit of the then Japanese Prime Minister — the accusation this time was not "efforts to overthrow the Government" but "insulting the President."

Although officially these trials are open to the public one can attend the sessions by applying for an entrance card, and the numbers are restricted.

Two more deported as PNG swoops on rebels

AUSTRALIAN 9/4/79

TWO Dutch nationals accused of aiding West Irianese guerrillas have been deported from Port Moresby as the Government of the Prime Minister, Mr Somare, continues its determined policy of closing all sanctuaries to the rebels.

The deportees, who were sent to Manila, Max Ireuw and Tan Sek Tai, are both former Irianese who took up residence in Holland after Indonesia acquired West New Guinea from the Dutch in 1962.

They were arrested on March 30 in Madang, a day after entering PNG through Port Moresby.

Before their arrests, Ireuw and Tan are believed to have ferried 20,000 Dutch guilders in aid to a faction of the rebel Free Papua Movement (OPM) led by the self-styled Brigadier-General Seth Rumkorem.

The two are members of Rumkorem's external Cabinet. Ireuw, a native of West Irian's capital, Jayapura, is believed to be Rumkorem's co-ordinator of information, radio and news services.

Tan, an ethnic Chinese born in the Moluccas, is listed in documents circulated in Holland by Rumkorem supporters as finance minister responsible for foreign trade, taxation and foreign investment.

Rumkorem now appears to be leading the OPM's internal arm following the capture by PNG security forces on September 27 last of his old rival, Jacob Pral.

Pral and four of his lieutenants were exiled to Sweden last month after representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had spent months trying to find a country that would accept them.

PNG's Foreign Minister, Mr Olewale, said that by deporting the dissidents he hoped to open a new era of peaceful development for the people of Irian Jaya.

The exiling of Pral is regarded by observers in Port Moresby as a deathblow for the poorly armed guerrilla movement. Port Moresby had hoped that Rumkorem and Martinus Tabu, the guerrilla responsible for kidnapping Indonesian officials last year, might also seek a life elsewhere and allow the two neighbors to forge a happier relationship.

But events in the past week have made this unlikely.

Two days after the arrest of Ireuw and Tan, 15 men armed with bows, arrows and guns staged a raid inside PNG territory on Yako refugee camp near the northern coastal town of Vanimo.

The raid was directed against two separatists who had crossed into PNG seeking refugee status.

Both claimed association with the OPM.

While the reason for the raid is not exactly clear, Mr Somare claimed the incident could only harden his Government's attitude toward the separatists and their cause. He said the attack was an illegal and hostile incursion into PNG and denounced it as cowardly.

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